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THE FREEDOM OF GOD 
Edward Wierenga 
Whenever God is in a situation in which one action is morally best, it follows, 
given his essential omniscience, omnipotence, and perfect goodness, that he 
knows that the action is best, wants to perform it, and is able to do so. But, 
necessarily, God does perform any action he knows to be best, wants to per-
form, and is able to do so. How could God be free with respect to such an 
action? I consider and reject a proposal due to Robert Adams that God might 
not want to do what is best. I then consider and deny a proposal due to 
Thomas Flint and Richard Swinburne that God's freedom is adequately 
secured by his at least occasionally facing situations in which no action is best. 
Finally, I defend the claim that God is free with respect to an action even when 
a logically sufficient condition of his performing it obtains, since that condition 
derives from God's own nature. 
Discussions of God and freedom typically focus on the relation of God's 
knowledge to human freedom. Of course, if there really is a conflict between 
divine foreknowledge and human free action, there might be the same con-
flict between divine foreknowledge and God's own free action. Thus, when 
Evodius confessed that "if I say that God foreknows all of my actions, I can 
much more confidently say that he foreknows his own actions and foresees 
with absolute certainty what he is going to do," Augustine responded, "Then 
aren't you worried that someone might object that God himself will act out of 
necessity rather than by his will in everything that he is going to do? After 
all, you said that whatever God foreknows happens by necessity, not by 
will. "1 In this paper, however, I want to investigate a different problem for 
God's own freedom, one that he would not share with other agents whose 
future actions he foreknows. Instead, it is a problem that arises precisely 
because, on classical theism, God is so different from his creatures. In particu-
lar, God is essentially omniscient, omnipotent, and perfectly good, whereas 
presumably no creature has those attributes, not even accidentally. It would 
seem to follow, therefore, that whenever God is in circumstances C in which a 
certain action A is the best action, he would know that A is the best action, he 
would want to do A, and he would be able to do A. That is, from 
(1) In C, A is the best action for God to do, 
it seems to follow, given God's essential possession of these divine attribut-
es, that 
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(2) In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is 
able to do A. 
But it also seems to be true that 
(3) If in C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and 
is able to do A, then God does A in C. 
Indeed, (3) would seem to be a necessary truth-how could an omnibenevo-
lent, omnipotent, and omniscient God fail to do what he knew to be best, 
wanted to do, and was able to do?2 But then in virtue of God's essential 
perfections, whenever he is in circumstances in which a certain action is the 
best, a logically sufficient condition obtains for his performing that action. 
But now a problem looms: if God is ever in such circumstances, it would 
seem that he is unable in those circumstances to refrain from performing 
the action in question. He could not refrain from performing the action in 
those circumstances, since it is impossible that he be in those circumstances 
and not perform it. As Thomas Flint puts it, characterizing this as a liber-
tarian view of freedom, "an agent is truly free with respect to an action 
only if the situation in which he is placed is logically and casually compati-
ble with both his performing and his not performing the action."3 In this 
paper I will investigate the problem of divine freedom for an essentially 
perfect being, on the assumption that libertarianism is the correct view 
about freedom. In the following section I will consider a solution that 
holds that God need not do what is best. Next, I will consider the response 
that God at least sometimes finds himself in circumstances in which there 
is no unique best action, so there is at least a range of cases in which he is 
free. Finally, I shall offer my own solution that challenges some standard 
assumptions about what libertarianism requires. 
1. Must God Create the Best? 
One way of avoiding this problem of divine freedom is to deny that God 
must do what is best. Robert Adams has defended this approach, holding 
that" even if there is a best among possible worlds, God could create anoth-
er instead of it, and still be perfectly good."4 Adams denies, in effect, the 
inference from (1) to (2). Now if God were in circumstances in which an 
action A is his best action, then it would be hard to reconcile his omni-
science with his not knowing that A is best. And I take it that, as a more 
detailed presentation of the problem would have put it, if an action is the 
best action for an agent it is one of the agent's alternatives, that is, one of the 
actions open to the agent. So it would also be difficult to deny that God 
would be able to perform the best action, even apart from his omnipotence. 
But Adam's view holds that it does not follow from God's perfect good-
ness that he would want to perform that action. This is suggested by 
Adams' remark quoted above, that God could fail to actualize the best pos-
sible world "and still be perfectly good." Moreover, Adams' defense of his 
position involves considering and rejecting reasons why God's failing to 
the best action would be wrong. 
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Adams concedes that "by utilitarian standards it is a moral obligation to 
bring about the best state of affairs that one can," but he rejects those stan-
dards in favor of ones he takes to be "more typical of Judeo-Christian reli-
gious ethics."s Accordingly, he casts about for other reasons why God's 
failing to actualize the best world would be wrong. He first considers the 
possibility that failing to actualize such a world would violate someone's 
rights, or involve treating someone unkindly, or harm someone. Adams 
has an ingenious response to this suggestion. He argues that if God were 
to harm anyone in his choice of a world, it would have to be someone he 
created. But by not actualizing the best possible world God would not 
harm the creatures existing in it if he failed to create them, since he could 
only have obligations to existing creatures. Next Adams claims that God 
could actualize a world having these features: 
(i) None of the individual creatures in it would exist in the best of 
all possible worlds. 
(ii) None of the creatures in it has a life which is so miserable on the 
whole that it would be better for that creature if it had never 
existed. 
(iii) Every individual creature in the world is at least as happy on 
the whole as it would have been in any other possible world in 
which it could have existed.6 
He then claims that if God does actualize a world having these features he 
does not wrong any of the creatures existing in it, "for none of them would 
have been benefitted by his creating any other world instead."7 Hence if 
God does actualize a world satisfying these conditions, none of the crea-
tures who would then exist would be harmed by God creating that world 
rather than a far better one. So if God could actualize a world satisfying 
these three traits, it looks as though Adams is correct in holding that God 
need not harm anyone or violate any creature's rights if he were to do less 
than the best that is open to him. That still leaves it open that there might 
be another reason why a perfectly good being might want to do what is 
best, but it would not be for wanting to refrain from harming anyone. 
Adams' second attempt to find a reason why a perfectly good being 
would want to do what is best is somewhat more complicated. Adams 
begins by inquiring whether choosing to make a world less good than he 
could have made would reveal a defect in God's character." He notes that 
an ideal of Judeo-Christian moral theory is grace, which he defines as "a 
disposition to love which is not dependent on the merit of the person 
loved."9 Adams then claims that "a God who is gracious with to respect to 
creating might well choose to create and love less excellent creatures than 
he could have chosen."lo Now if this is merely to identify some virtue God 
has that is compatible with doing less than his best, it would not establish 
that doing so is compatible with his moral goodness, for he might have 
other virtues not thus compatible. And it is not surprising that some virtues 
would be compatible with doing less than one's best. Adams in fact identi-
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fies as virtues being noble, being high-minded, and being free from envy,l1 
all of which would seem to be compatible with doing less than what was 
best. So either Adams' defense is incomplete or else God's exercise of 
grace plays some positive role or makes some contribution to the value of 
his action (or to a world he actualizes) which enables it to provide a moral 
justification of God's doing less than his best. 
However, Adams says something that initially suggests that he would 
deny that the exercise of grace makes such a contribution. After claiming 
that "a God who is gracious with respect to creating might well choose to 
create and love less excellent creatures than he could have chosen," he 
adds 
This is not to suggest that grace in creation consists in a preference for 
imperfection as such. God could have chosen to create the best of all 
possible creatures, and still have been gracious in choosing them. 
God's graciousness in creation does not imply that the creatures he 
has chosen to create must be less excellent than the best possible. It 
implies, rather, that even if they are the best possible creatures, that is 
not the ground for his choosing them. And it implies that there is 
nothing in God's nature or character which would require him to act 
on the principle of choosing the best possible creatures to be the 
object of his creative powers. 12 
If God is gracious both in the best of all possible worlds (temporarily 
assuming with Adams that there is one) as well as in some lesser worlds, it 
is hard to see how his graciousness can make more of a difference in the 
value of one world rather than another. 
There is a way of thinking of these things, however, that suggests that 
divine grace might actually make a difference to the value of a world. 
Perhaps in worlds with less perfect creatures God exercises more gracious-
ness, or perhaps his graciousness is more magnificent for going so far beyond 
what is deserved. The former idea is suggested by a familiar question 
raised in Romans, "Should we continue in sin in order that grace may 
abound?" (Rom. 6:1b). Paul's answer, of course, is that eliciting additional 
grace is not a good reason to sin; but he does not deny the principles that 
added sin results in extra grace and that extra grace is a good thing. A relat-
ed idea is that of felix culpa, as found in the Exsultet: 0 felix culpa, quae talem 
ac tantum meruit habere Redemptorem! COh happy sin that merited so great a 
redeemer").13 A way of understanding this thought is that God's gracious 
gift of redemption through the incarnation of his son makes such a contri-
bution to the value of the world that its value exceeds that of a world in 
which no one sins. Indeed, in his discussion of the incarnation, Aquinas 
cites both of these passages in support of his contention that "there is no 
reason why human nature should not have been raised to something 
greater after sin. For God allows evils to happen in order to bring a greater 
good therefrom" (S.T. III, 3, ad 3). In other words, the addition of God's gra-
ciousness, especially in the form of the incarnation, results in a greater good 
(a world of higher value) than a world with no sin and less grace.'4 
If human nature is "raised to something greater" by God's gracious pro-
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vision of transformation and sanctification through the incarnation, then 
God's graciousness could make a world better and it would give him a rea-
son to prefer some worlds to others. Adams might be right that "nothing 
in God's nature or character ... would require him to ... choos[el the best 
possible creatures" but that is because it might compel him instead to cre-
ate a world with creatures who could be made better. In other words, it 
might give him a reason to actualize a world containing corruptible crea-
tures who need fixing rather than a world with creatures who are perfect 
in the first place!!. 
Is divine incarnation so great a good that any world that contains it is 
infinitely valuable? Would all worlds with a divine incarnation therefore 
be tied for best? These are difficult questions, and to attempt answers 
without a fuller account what gives worlds their value, of how to value the 
incarnation and the changes it makes, and how to compare values if they 
are infinite is rash.15 Fortunately, we do not need to answer these questions 
to see that Adams' attempt to show that a good God might not want to do 
what is best is incomplete. Perhaps, as Adams argues, God has some traits 
of character, not wanting to cause harm, or, possibly, being gracious, that 
are compatible with not wanting to do what is best. But this leaves it open 
that a perfectly good God has other traits of character that do make him 
want to do what is best. And it may be that the second of the traits Adams 
identifies, namely, graciousness, can make enough of a difference to the 
value of worlds actually to give God a reason to want to do what is best. 
II. A Range of Choices 
Adams denies, in effect, that 
(2) In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is 
able to do A. 
follows from 
(1) In C, A is the best action for God to do, 
In contrast, Richard Swinburne and Thomas Flint seem to accept not only 
this inference, but the principle, 
(3) If in C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and 
is able to do A, then God does A in C, 
as well. They agree, as Swinburne puts it, that "God's perfect 
goodness ... constrains him to act in certain ways,"l(· that "God's goodness 
thus limits his capacity for choice."'7 
Accordingly, Swinburne and Flint attempt to describe cases in which 
God is presented with a range of choices, so that he will cOtmt as free at 
least in those circumstances in which he is faced with such an array. 
Swinburne begins by endorsing the claim that "if there is a best action, 
[God] will do it," but he adds that "if there are alternative equal best 
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actions, he will do one of them."18 So the first case in which God's good-
ness leaves him room to make a free choice is the case in which there are 
equally good alternatives from which to choose. 
The second case is that of an infinite range of choices of a certain sort. 
Swinburne introduces this case as follows, 
often the range of actions open to God is an infinite range of actions, 
each of which is inferior to some other action. Thus, for any world 
of conscious agents which God could create ex nihilo, there is plausi-
bly a better one-for instance, one obtained by adding one more con-
scious agent (sufficiently distant from the others not to crowd them). 
And so among the actions of creating conscious agents ex nihilo there 
is no best.19 
It is important to note, as Swinburne does, that just as when more than one 
alternative is tied for best, God's goodness constrains him to choose from 
the set of those tied for best, so, when there is an infinite range of possibili-
ties, each one inferior to some other, if it is better to choose one of those 
alternatives rather than none, then God's goodness constrains him to choose 
from that range. In Swinburne's example, if it is better to have a world with 
conscious agents created ex nihilo than not to, then God's goodness con-
strains him to pick from the infinite range of worlds like that. But the par-
ticular choice of alternative, both in the case of ties for best and in the case of 
infinite series with no best, is up to God. As Swinburne puts it, "Insofar as 
he acts within that framework, his perfect goodness does not dictate what 
he will do; and any acts within that framework we may call acts of will. "20 
Thomas Flint's position is structurally similar. He imagines God to face 
a "galaxy" of worlds open to him to actualize. Some of these galaxies are 
"oligarchic": there is a maximallevel of goodness that the available worlds 
can have, and more than one world has it. Other galaxies are "anarchic": 
for any world in it, there is a better.21 In the former case, God has a range of 
choices tied for best, and in the latter case, God has an infinite range to 
choose from. Flint concludes that "neither an anarchic nor an oligarchic 
galaxy endangers God's freedom."22 
So both Swinburne and Flint think that God is free in at least certain sit-
uations, namely, when he faces a tie for best alternative or when there is an 
infinite series of increasingly better alternatives with no best.23 A potential 
problem, looms, however. Some philosophers hold that a perfectly good 
being (or at least one who is either omnipotent or omniscient) cannot be in 
a situation in which there are infinitely many better and better alternatives. 
On the face of it, this is a startling claim. Why should whether a being is 
perfectly good limit the structure of what situations it can face?24 Philip 
Quinn gives the following reason, which is intended to apply to omnipotent 
moral agents. He takes it to be "a fairly obvious truth" that 
(4) Necessarily, for all w, w' and x, if w is an actualizable world and 
w' is an actualizable world and w is a morally better world than 
w', then if x is an omnipotent moral agent and x actualizes w', 
then x is such that there is some possible world in which there 
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is a y such that y is a better moral agent in that world than he 
[that is, xl is in W'.25 
Quinn's idea, although (4) does not exactly state this, is that if x were to actu-
alize a world w' when there is a better world wavailable, then it is possible 
that someone actualize wand thereby be a morally better agent than x is. But 
if it is possible for someone to be morally better than x, then x is not morally 
peifect. This assumes that the value of the work redounds precisely to the 
moral status of the agent. This assumption seems to me far from obvious, 
but perhaps we can see that by considering another version of the objection. 
In William Rowe's version, it is God's omniscience which added to 
moral perfection prevents him from being in a situation in which he faces 
an infinite series of increasingly better alternatives. Rowe claims 
(5) If an omniscient being creates a world when there is a better 
world it could create, then it would be possible for there to be a 
being morally better than it.2" 
In support of this thesis, which he takes to be "plausible, if not self-evi-
dent," Rowe adds, "if an omniscient being creates a world when it could 
have created a better world, then that being has done something less good 
than it could do (create a better world). But any being who knowingly 
does something .. .less good than it could do falls short of being the best 
possible being."27 Whatever plausibility this principle might have in the 
case of choices among a finite number of alternatives seems to me to disap-
pear when the choice in question is from among an infinite number of 
choices where it is better to pick one rather than none. But Rowe has more 
to say in its defense: he claims that some cases devised by Daniel and 
Frances Howard-Snyder, intended to show that beings who choose differ-
ently among an infinite set of increasingly better alternatives can be moral-
lyequivalent, actually show the opposite. The Howard-Snyder's first sup-
pose that worlds can be divided into what I shall call permissible and 
impermissible worlds.28 Permissible worlds are those in which no individ-
uals have lives not worth living and no evils are unjustified by a compen-
sating good. Impermissible worlds are those in which some individuals 
have lives that are not worth living, or some evils have no compensating 
good. They then suppose that the permissible worlds can be ordered 
according to value, and they propose three scenarios in which a deity 
chooses one of the permissible worlds. In the original case, their deity, 
Jove, employs a randomizing device which selects world 777. The 
Howard-Snyder's then propose two alternative scenarios. In the first, a 
second deity, Juno, uses the same randomizing device and as a result 
chooses world 999. They claim that Jove and Juno are morally equivalent. 
Next they consider a third deity, Thor, who, eschewing the randomizer, 
nevertheless aims at creating a better world than Jove and so chooses 
world 888. The Howard-Snyder's contend that Thor is not morally better 
than Jove, either. It is at this point that Rowe disagrees. He claims that 
Jove and Thor might have different standards in virtue of which Thor 
would count as morally superior. He writes, "Jove's standard of goodness 
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in world creating is such that he is prepared to settle for any good [permis-
sible] world even if there is a better one he can create. Thor, however, has 
a higher standard. He is not prepared to create any of the good worlds 
from WI to W800 provided there is a better one he can create." Rowe con-
cludes that his assessment of Thor undermines the attempt of the Howard-
Snyder'S to discredit (5). 
A modest revision of these stories shows, I think, that there is no differ-
ence between these deities, after all. As they develop their account, the 
Howard-Snyder's assume that there is a minimal permissible world. 
(Their numbering begins with 1.) But why should we think that an infinite 
array of permissible worlds such that for every world there is a better must 
have a least valuable member? Perhaps those features that make a world 
permissible have no lower bound. Swinburne identifies among the things 
that contribute to the value of a world, in addition to the presence of con-
scious agents, "the kinds of knowledge and powers [God] gives to things 
and ... the lengths of days he keeps them in being." We might add to this 
list the amount of pleasure these agents experience or the kind of compen-
sation there is for the evils they endure. It is plausible to suppose that hav-
ing conscious agents with knowledge and power, who live acceptably long 
lives, relatively free of pain and compensated in appropriate ways for the 
evils they endure contributes to the value of a world. And, of course, there 
will be no limit to how many such agents there could be, no limit to how 
long they could live, and no limit to how sufficiently they can be compen-
sated for the evil they endure. That is why it seemed plausible to suppose 
that there could be an infinite series of ever more valuable permissible 
worlds. But it seems equally plausible that there might be no lowest 
acceptable level of knowledge and power, no shortest acceptable lifespan, 
no minimal acceptable amount of pleasure or compensation for evil for a 
world to be permissible. In other words, just as there might be no best of 
all possible worlds, there might also be no least acceptable world. So when 
God chooses a world, or when the deities in the Howard-Snyder's example 
choose a world, it might not only be the case that for any world chosen 
there is a better; it might also be the case that for any world chosen there is 
an acceptable world that is not as good. In that case, it is hard to see how 
Thor in the example could be acting on a nobler principle or higher stan-
dard than Jove. Each picks a world to which infinitely many worlds are 
superior and which is itself superior to infinitely many other worlds. Thor 
does not have a principle according to which he rejects as unsuitable more 
worlds than Jove rejects. There can be no basis for Thor's rejection of 
worlds lower than 800, if there are infinitely many in that category; both 
make an arbitrary choice. These deities can create worlds of differing 
value without thereby differing themselves in goodness. 
I have been arguing in support of the proposal of Swinburne and Flint 
that God might be presented with an infinite series of worlds from which 
to choose with no feature of any of those worlds compelling him, in virtue 
of his perfect goodness, to create it. They had suggested that, as well as the 
possibility that God might be presented with ties for best action, as part of 
an attempt to provide room for God to act freely, unconstrained by his per-
fect nature. Bu! it is time to return to the question of whether this proposal 
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is an adequate defense of God's freedom. I think that it is not, for it 
amounts to saying that God is free only when it does not matter what he does. 
In any situation in which there is a best action open to God, Swinburne and 
Flint agree that his nature compels him to do it. They only find room for 
God's freedom in circumstances in which any choice he makes is on a par 
with any other, where he might as well choose blindly or randomly, and 
that is not a significant amount of freedom. 
III. God's Freedom 
We began by noticing that it seems to follow from 
(1) In C, A is the best action for God to do, 
that 
(2) In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is 
able to do A. 
Moreover, 
(3) If in C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and 
is able to do A, then God does A in C 
appears to be necessarily true. Then we asked how God could ever be free, 
if, whenever an action was his best alternative, a necessary condition of his 
performing it, namely, (2) it obtains. Adams attempted, unsuccessfully I 
claimed, to deny the inference of (2) from (1). Swinburne and Flint accept 
the conclusion that God is not free whenever he has a best alternative, and 
they try to delineate what I claimed to be an unacceptably limited role for 
his freedom, namely, when what he chooses does not matter. We should, I 
think, look more closely at the assumption that if a necessary condition for 
God's performing an action obtains, then he does not perform that action 
freely. Thomas Flint claims, as we saw, that "an agent is truly free with 
respect to an action only if the situation in which he is placed is logically 
and casually compatible with both his performing and his not performing 
the action."3l No doubt libertarians will agree that an agent is free with 
respect to performing an action only if there are no antecedent causally suf-
ficient conditions for the agent's performing the action. But why should 
we, even if we are libertarians, extend this to antecedent logically sufficient 
conditions? After all, at least some libertarians are prepared to counte-
nance the prior truth that an agent will (freely) perform an action, despite 
its being a logically sufficient condition of the agent's performing the 
action. So why should we think that the truth of 
(2) In C God knows that A is the best action, wants to do A, and is 
able to doA 
is incompatible with God's doing A freely in C? 
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Here I think an appeal to compatibilist accounts of free will, of all 
things, is instructive. Compatibilists hold that an action can be free even 
though antecedent causal conditions for its performance exist. But canny 
compatibilists32 insist that not just any antecedent causal conditions are so 
compatible-they have to be the right ones, arising in the right matter. 
Often the right ones are taken to be the agent's beliefs and desires. And the 
right manner is the customary way in which people come to have beliefs 
and desires, not through drugs or hypnosis or nefarious neurosurgeons 
manipulating their brains. The compatibilist then defends the claim that 
an action caused by an agent's beliefs and desires arising in the right way 
is nevertheless free by emphasizing that the beliefs and desires are the 
agent's own, that they are internal to the agent. 
Those who reject the compatibilist account are often persuaded by argu-
ments, like those of Peter van Inwagen,33 that purport to show that, if deter-
minism is true, an agent's beliefs and desires themselves have antecedent 
causes stretching back to before the agent even existed. The relevant 
causal conditions are thus not really internal to the agent.34 The insight, to 
repeat, of the compatibilist is that the right antecedent conditions, internal 
to the agent, are compatible with the agent acting freely; on this interpreta-
tion, the compatibilist's mistake is in taking the proffered conditions to be 
internal in this way. 
Let us apply the compatibilist's insight to the case of God. Even if in 
some circumstances C God's knowing that A is the best action, his wanting 
to do A, and his being able to do A is a logically sufficient condition of his 
doing A in C, it is nevertheless in virtue of his own nature that he knows that 
A is the best action, wants to do A, and is able to do A.35 There is no long 
chain stretching back to things separate from him that give him this con-
stellation of knowledge, desire, and ability; it is due to his own knowledge 
and power and goodness. I see no reason not to say, accordingly, that God 
is free, even when he does what is best.36 
University of Rochester 
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